Identity Change in Ninety Minutes

The Cognitive, Evaluative and Emotional Dynamics of Identity Change at a Political Rally

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Abstract

The paper will unite three approaches mostly lacking synergy so far to explain what happened at a political rally in 2013 in Budapest. The first approach is Henri Tajfel's claim that social identity has three components: knowledge, emotion and evaluation. The second is the so-called emotional or affective turn in social sciences in general and in political science in particular. Finally, the third is the recent interest in the crowds and crowd behaviour in sociology. The research underpinning the paper focused on a political rally in Budapest in 2013 which was meant to be a mass event in order to unite and mobilize the fragmented political left half year before the parliamentary elections but concluded in a passionate anger by the crowd against the leader of Hungarian Socialist Party the biggest leftist organization in Hungary. The seven speakers, constructing and offering the crowd different versions of a leftist identity, put forward cognitive and evaluative as well as emotion inciting discourses that had intertwined and reinforced each other by the time the socialist leader entered the scene. The dynamics of the interference between the discourses and the emotions in creating, strengthening as well as weakening identities will be presented applying the theory of interaction ritual chains and the frustration-shame-anger theory. The paper will, therefore, support the claim that instead of presupposing identity loss at crowd events, one should look for the signs of identity change through the interaction within the crowd as well as between the crowd and the political leaders.

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Introduction

On the 23rd of October, 2013, a big crowd gathered to participate in the rally of the Hungarian political left[1] in Budapest. The demonstration started in the usual way: the audience was listening to the first speakers, flared up hearing the name of the rightist prime minister and his party, and applauded when something encouraging was said. After the third speech, however, the mood started to change and, finally, they did not let the president of the Hungarian Socialist Party (MSZP), the eighth politician, start to speak for long. They were whistling, chanting and clamouring all along the speech, blaming the socialist leader for the weakness and the forthcoming defeat of the left at the next elections in six months and were asking for an overarching union on the left.

The change shocked the president and most of the leftist observers in the media and, presumably, on the political left in general. The first political reactions suspected conspiracy behind the developments: one of the leftist party leaders was presumed to have organized the clamouring, he was even accused of paying to the shouters. Another explanation claimed that crowds are always like that: no participant can resist the crowd or mob when it starts to shout. A third version tried to see the authentic criticism of the people in the clamouring: the participants wanted to express their negative opinion of the politics of the socialist leader.

The present paper wants to give a complex description of the event in order to clarify the nature of political rallies in general and this one in particular. It has to be complex because several factors seem to have had influence on what happened.

- The political circumstances: the fragmented state of the left, the personal and political conflicts among the leftist leaders, the recent developments in the preparation to the approaching elections etc. made it a delicate event.
- The leftist identity of the participants also played a part and that leads us to questions like how fast a political identity can change; whether identification with a political community can reverse in just ninety minutes; whether it does make sense to call something so unstable an identity at all.
- And, finally, the crowd: are there specificities of the crowd behaviour? Is one really inevitably swept away by the crowd, by the emotions of the mob so that one changes political engagement and belonging in ninety minutes?

In order to answer the questions, the paper will first delineate the most important concepts used in the research. Secondly, it describes the political situation in Hungary in the autumn of 2013. Then the method and the data sources are presented. The greater part of the text interprets the interactions that proceeded between the speakers and the crowd in order to show the cognitive, evaluative and emotional dynam-

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[1] I will use the label "left" and "leftist" to name the whole camp, although, as we will see it, the politicians called themselves democrats, "the democratic opposition" instead, suggesting that the governing parties and the rest of the opposition were not democratic. Still, in the scientific discourse and in the everyday speech, this camp was referred to as left and leftist because it was located to the left in the political space.

ics. Finally, some lessons are drawn regarding the importance of the crowd events in politics.

Conceptual grounding

What I want to describe and explicate is an apparent identity change: a transformation that moved the participants in the rally from accepting and adopting leftist political identity to a mood where they rejected the most powerful leader of the leftist political camp. First, we have to find out what kind of identity concept can come to our help. Second, we need a useful concept of community because the leftist political community was represented at the rally. Third, crowd and crowd behaviour have to be defined because a big mass of people stepped forward for a while. Fourth, we also have to clarify what leadership means because political leaders gave speeches and a political leader suffered the incident.

Identity and community

There seem to be two extremes in the uses of the concept of identity. Originally, identity was defined, by, e.g., Erik Erikson (1963, 1968) as the unchangeable, even if modifiable, structure of personality showing continuity among the ever changing conditions that surround a person. In this sense, then, identity change is self-contradictory because identity is the core self, a kind of transcendental unit, that, by definition, does not change; it manages the changes instead.

The Eriksonian approach turned to be important in political science too, particularly in political socialisation literature (e.g., Jennings-Niemi 1981). Accordingly, political socialisation has an outstandingly important period in life: the age between 15 and 25. The identification with parties and political stands taking place in that period will last long, perhaps until the end of life. In that sense, what we have here is political identity indeed, because identity is what proves to be stable in a remarkably long period of life.

At the other extreme, social identity paradigm, as elaborated by Henri Tajfel (e.g., 1981) and John C. Turner (1975), defines identity as group bound, changing according to one's momentary belonging to diverse groups. Even random divisions result in serious differences in the preferences between members belonging to artificially separated groups. In this sense, then, identity change is self-evident because it happens parallel with the situations by definition.

Tajfel (1972: 292) also emphasised that social identity has three components: a cognitive, an evaluative and an emotional one. Each component has influence on the group member in two dimensions.

- Cognitive component is about one's knowledge of belonging to the group, and also about things the group considers important to know about. This way, one

adopts the group's knowledge of the world and of the group itself within the world.

- The evaluative component consists of the adoption of the norms followed by the group. The member assigns higher values to the ingroup and lower to the outgroup. But the evaluative component is also wider: the members appreciate and condemn what the group does. The ingroup bias has the corollary that, if the members know that the group is weaker than the outgroup in some areas, they will find realms where the former is still more valuable than the latter.

- Finally, the emotional component contains the affective attachment one has towards the ingroup and, in several cases, negative sentiments towards the outgroup. Again, emotional component also covers the taking over of the sentiments of the group toward things in general.

The approach has much bearing to political identity too (see Huddy 2013).[2] One's political identity is a social identity with political importance. The group one belongs to has knowledge, norms, and emotions about politicians, political issues, political past, present and future developments etc., which one knows and follows, interiorizes and feels.

The shortcoming of the social identity paradigm is that it exclusively focuses on content: cognitive, evaluative and emotional meanings and tenor located somewhere in the minds of the group members. The content is, however, preceded by and interwoven with procedures, interactions (Schegloff 1992) particularly in intersubjective situations like rallies. In the paper, I will, therefore, complicate the social/political identity concept a bit further leaning mainly on the interactionist approach elaborated by Garfinkel, Goffman and Mead.

Accordingly, while political identity is shaped by the situations one finds oneself in and by the groups one has chosen, shaping happens in interaction with the circumstances, within and without the group and, as a result, past identifications also play a part; in short: identity is changeable but its changes are under the influence of past identifications, which may solidify into something closer to the Eriksonian sense of identity. The interactionist approach concerns all the three components: there is a continuous negotiation on the political knowledge, beliefs, norms and feelings between the person and the environment.

Crowds and leaders

In sociology, Gabriel Tarde (1901) was the first to differentiate people with regard to their physical locality. He distinguished the diffuse mass and called them public (*public*) from crowd (*foule*), which is the physically gathered grouping of people. Unfortunately, after Tarde, social sciences mostly reduced the research focus to the public and the topic of crowd was marginalized even in social psychology. What is even

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[2] And also her debate with Oakes: Huddy 2001, 2002 and Oakes 2002.

more unfavourable, crowd was identified with mob as much as crowd behaviour with panic situations when people seem to lose their heads and cast off.

Outside ethnography and anthropology, political rallies and crowds are not studied frequently if at all in social sciences.[3] They are usually referred to as ephemeral in politics: if they are violent, the deep seated grievances are to be uncovered, whereas if they are calm, the participants presumably obey to the politicians, like at the notorious public ceremonies of the totalitarian regimes (Gentile 1993, Berezin 1997). Even campaigning literature prefers to subsume mass events to the pre-modern type (Norris 2002) and movement studies also focus on the political opportunity structures that give protest groupings chance to emerge (cf. Jasper 2012).

Recently, a couple of factors have started to urge the scholars to pay closer attention to rallies and the behaviour of crowds. The paradigm of the "power of events in history", underlined by Sewell (1996) and referred to by history writing (e.g., Berezin 2009) has made "event," also a single demonstration in case, worth studying. Particularly since the "emotional turn" in social sciences, occasions when emotions are spectacularly and intensely present are hardly ignorable (Goodwin et al. 2001; Goodwin and Jasper 2004; Flam and King 2005).

When it comes to description, scholars mostly concentrate, however, on the cognitive aspects, like confessions in interviews and memories put into words by the participants (Davis and Boles 2003, Yang 2005, Routledge 2008). True: it is obviously rather difficult to measure the emotional happenings during an event, thus, the description would give results unreliable from a sociological and political science point of view. Moreover, an important school of emotional studies claim that emotions are culturally determined and constructed anyway (Hochshild 1983, Illouz 1997);[4] they can, therefore, be examined by studying the symbols and discourses people use in reconstructing and remembering them.

Recently, social identity theory has produced important results on crowd behaviour and leadership. Stephen Reicher (2011) made an elucidating distinction between physical and psychological crowds. Physical crowd consists of people gathered by chance, like commuters on a train, while psychological crowd is formed on purpose or at least the members are aware that their physical togetherness has a goal, it makes sense.

Obviously, the crowd at a rally belongs to the category of psychological crowd: the participants want to be present at the place and they also know why the others are there, namely, to demonstrate their identification with the case the organizers hold the event for. Reicher also claims that in psychological crowds and crowd events, like rallies, no identity loss happens as literature supposed for long after Gustave Le Bon's works (Le Bon 1895, 1910). Crowds do not deliver people to the irresponsibility and irrationality of the mob; participants rather follow the norms and behaviours sanctioned by the group they belong to.

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[3] Recently, some scholars started to reevaluate the relevance of the crowd for social theory: Borch 2009.
[4] See also Boiger and Mesquita (2012) and the replies in the same issue.

Crowds have a special importance for the political communities. Since rallies, particularly the big ones, are covered by the media, definitely by the media outlets belonging to the given political community, the crowd present at the rally represents the wider political community for the viewers; the crowd is the effective community vis-à-vis the imagined community for both the participants and the viewers. The behaviour, the agreement and disagreement the crowd shows at the event and the interpretations afterwards certainly have a deep influence on the social and political identity of the people within the political community. That is probably taken into account by the politicians and the organizers when they decide on the timing, place and form of the rally the order of the speakers included.

Politicians, political leaders play specific roles in the communities in general and at rallies in particular. Social identity theory claims that every group and community has a prototype (e.g. Hogg 2001), an imagined or real person who carries or personifies the typical features of the group. Particularly in political communities and under the conditions of mediatisation and presidentialisation (Pakulski-Körösényi 2012), the political leader is the prototype. The members cognitively and behaviourally conform to the prototype, that is, to the leader, which, in turn, gives him or her much influence and power over the group. A rally is a very good occasion for the leader to show him or herself, and fulfil those tasks, meet those needs. The events are organized in a way that the paramount leader is the last to speak; his speech is a kind of summit of the rally. The pattern has the reverse consequence that the last speaker is usually guessed to be the leader of the community.

Hogg elaborates on the cases when prototypicality of a person is questioned. The leader may use three strategies to redress the situation: strengthen the old prototype, pillory the ingroup deviants, and demonize outgroup. In politics, all the strategies are rather easily used because the incumbent leader has the most channels and occasions to implement them. We will see what strategies were used at the 2013 rally.

Emotions

Although Tajfel mentioned emotions as an important component of social identity, for long no attention was paid to sentiments probably because of the hegemony of rational choice in political science and of the cognitivist dominance in psychology. Due to Antonio Damasio's works (1994 and 2003), however, emotions are not ignorable anymore when it comes to decision making (Marcus 2002, Neuman et al. 2007) or social movements (Goodwin-Jasper-Polletta 2001, Gould 2004, Jasper 2012) and political protest (Juris 2008, Yang 2005). Feelings are not separable from cognitions either emotions from reason; rather the opposite: they are in interaction with each other. Feelings urge reason to turn to and scrutinize (political) processes around (Marcus 2002), and new knowledge leads to feelings as well as cold blooded decisions. Reason and emotion also intertwine and knowledge is permeated by feelings and the other way around. The affective turn has influence on crowd research too because frequently the emotional salience of speeches are more important than cognitive content.

Randall Collins's works elaborating the theory of interaction ritual chains offer a hopeful way to follow. Collins (2004) claims that the rationale of public gatherings is the emotional energy that springs from the physical co-presence and the synchronization of the bodies and locomotion, gestures and voices among the participants. People fill up with emotions: positive if the interaction is successful, negative if unsuccessful. The emotions result in emotional energy, which is the long term benefit of the event stabilizing identity, that is, the belonging to the community.

Not every demonstration is successful emotionally. Thomas Scheff (1990) writes about failed interactions. These are cases when partners are unable to attune: one of them rejects the other, cannot notice what the other expects. The rejection leads to injury and frustration, and, deteriorating, first to shame and, second, to anger, which may spill over and pour on the partner. Rejection leads to shame and anger in case the parties are unable to discuss the situation; in the case of a rally, discussion of the tension would take the form of the speaker's overt or at least perceptible efforts to satisfy the needs of the crowd, even if s/he had to improvise. If, however, that does not happen, a cumulative spiral of rejection – frustration – shame – anger is building up and finally may result in an outburst of fury. Exactly that is what happened at the demonstration.

The political situation in Hungary up to the 23rd of October, 2013

In a sense, the October 23 rallies were the starting events of the long party campaigns running up to the general elections on the 6th of April, 2014. All the parties and the public were aware that Hungary would have elections in not more than six months; all the three political communities organized rallies during the day not far from each other in space and time.

The opinion polls said that the centre-right government coalition, that is, *Fidesz* (Alliance of the Young Democrats) led by prime minister *Viktor Orbán* and *KDNP* (Christian Democratic People's Party), had the best chance to win the coming elections and even repeat the success of 2010 when they had reached a two-third majority. Still, the public and the political elite had already experienced a big surprise in 2002, when, in spite of the favourable opinion poll results for the right, the left won the elections.

The left was divided manifold; in the October of 2013, several parties and movements belonged to the camp. In Hungary, being on the political left did not indicate economic or social policy orientations; all the parties and movements attacking the government coalition but not from the radical right pole were considered to be on the left even if they were conservative or liberal. Below, I introduce only the parties, movements and politicians, who spoke and were represented at the analysed rally.

The biggest leftist party, *MSZP* (Hungarian Socialist Party) had been in government in three previous periods: 1994 to 1998, 2002 to 2006 and 2006 to 2010 but, during the last two four year cycles, the world financial crisis and the misgovernment had led to the serious shrinking of the support. The new and young party leader, *Attila Mester-*

házy made successful efforts to get rid of the past leading figures and, after many skirmishes, late Prime Minister *Ferenc Gyurcsány* left the party.

Leaving MSZP, Ferenc Gyurcsány founded a new party with the name Democratic Coalition (*DK*). DK identified itself as a central left party and announced liberal programme. Beside Viktor Orbán, Ferenc Gyurcsány was thought to be the only charismatic politician in Hungary, thus, a great asset for his party. On the other hand, because of the serious events that had happened during his period as Prime Minister, he was also a big liability.

In 2009 *Gordon Bajnai* replaced Ferenc Gyurcsány as prime minister for a year. Bajnai had been considered fairly successful in crisis management until the 2010 elections, when he did not run for the office. He left Hungary in 2010 and spent two years in the United States giving university lectures. In 2012, he returned with the obvious ambition to become Prime Minister in 2014 again by uniting all the leftist and disappointed rightist voters and all the leftist and centrist parties, MSZP included, under his leadership. He formally started his campaign for the unification on the 23rd of October 2012, that is, exactly one year before the events the paper is to present. Soon it turned out, however, that he could not reach his goal and, hence, he founded a centre-left party called *Együtt 2014* (E-2014, Together 2014) in 2013.

Párbeszéd Magyarországért (PM – Dialogue for Hungary), a faction of the green party in Parliament, joined the alliance E-2014 had established, and from then on they were called Együtt 2014 – PM. The party was represented at the rally by a co-president, *Tímea Szabó*.

Within the year before the 2014 elections several further parties, movements and civil society associations were established or became more active. Some of them, actually the more visible, were led by politicians from the previous leftist governments.

- The least known party represented at the rally was led by *Klára Ungár*, who had left Fidesz in 1993.
- In early 2013, a new liberal party was started by *Gábor Fodor*, who had been minister and the leader of the past liberal party in government.
- *Lajos Bokros* had been finance minister in a socialist government from 1995 to 1996 but afterwards he turned conservative liberal and became a Member of the European Parliament in 2009. In 2013, he established a conservative liberal party open for an alliance with the left against the ruling rightist coalition.
- Finally, a late minister and another past leader of the late liberal party, *Gábor Kuncze*, heading a civil association also showed ambition in the middle of 2013 to run for a parliamentary membership in coalition with the leftist parties.

After dragging conflicts and negotiations, in August 2013, MSZP and E-2014 – PM decided to make an alliance for the next elections. They had talks with the rest of the main parties on the left but could not reach agreement; therefore the two political forces left the rest out of the union and established a narrow alliance. That caused much consternation among the leftist parties and also among a part of the centre-left voters. Moreover, MSZP and E-2014 – PM signed the coalition agreement on the 22nd of October 2013, that is, on the very previous day before the rally.

The aim of the rally in front of the University of Technology and Economics in Budapest was announced by the leftist media to unite the leaders and the supporters of the disintegrated Left into one body so that they could collectively beat Viktor Orbán in April.[5] Surprisingly little information was available on the agenda before the event. Only a single article was published in the early morning (7:05 am) on the very day by the online edition of a socialist daily paper. The article emphasized that the full spectrum of the centre left should take part in the demonstration in order to show the union of the anti-government political forces in the beginning of the campaign: "the politicians would concentrate on what brought them together and not on the differences between them".[6]

The comments sent by users to the Facebook showed that most of the anti-government voters did not believe in the success of the rally. They doubted the possibility of building a winning alliance and many were blaming Attila Mesterházy (MSZP) and Ferenc Gyurcsány (DK) for the weak performance of the leftist opposition. Still, a kind of moderate optimism was also present: some wrote that the event could be the first step of broadening the electoral alliance by admitting all the leftist parties and organizations outside the exclusive pact of October 22. Otherwise, a joint demonstration would not make sense, they thought.

Methods and data

The hypothesis of the paper is that the group of the speakers did not meet the expectations of the crowd regarding the social and political identity needs; and that resulted in the rage against the socialist leader. The uncertainties of the unity because of the previous conflicts in alliance building made the participants eager to see what it meant to be leftist in Hungary right then, in six months before the elections, when they would like to vote for the left. A great part of them probably decided to attend the demonstration in order to get confirmation of their leftist identity but the politicians provided them with insufficient or at least conflicting clues and messages. The leaders did not give coherent cognitive, evaluative and emotional components for identity construction and experience. Along the rally, the participants' identities certainly changed but not in the way they had foreseen it.

In order to describe the identity change, the analysis will study the dynamics of the three components of political identity. The components are separable only analytically, otherwise they operate in interaction. Still, one has different means to discern and measure each. Since identity is the attachment to a group and detachment from another one, each component has a positive and a negative content: one concerning the ingroup, which is the leftist political community and another one referring to the outgroup, the political right, that is, Fidesz, the government and prime minister Viktor Orbán.

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[5] https://www.facebook.com/events/445217525598443/
[6] A szabadság összeköt, népszava.hu, October 23, 2013.

A rally is a series of interactions among the participants and between the crowd and the speaker. Analysis can lean on the texts of speeches to find the identity components. The audience rarely speaks intelligibly; what we have is some vocalization and manipulation, that is, chanting, oohing, booing, laughing, shouting as well as applause/clapping and synchroclapping (Schweingruber-McPhail 1999). The analyst should measure the length of these noises and voices, which usually are spontaneous reactions if come fast or forced reactions, when come after an interval.

Cognitive component

Cognitive component covers primarily the knowledge of the belonging to a group and secondarily knowledge of the political facts, developments and activities relevant for the community. A rally can strengthen the cognitive component by defining and redefining the content of political identity under the current conditions, that is, at the start of the electoral campaigns and just on the morrow of the signing the narrow alliance by MSZP and E-2014 – PM. The speakers are supposed to carry out that task at the rally and provide the audience with the necessary information: what it means to be leftist and what it means to be rightist, what makes left a political community.

I will scrutinise the speeches to find clues of leftist belonging and political knowledge, whether such were put forward at all and, in case they were, what kind of image they constructed, whether that was coherent. It is also important to see which clues had the most remarkable effects among the participants. That can be measured by the length and vivacity of the reactions.

Evaluative component

Identity in the sense of belonging affects the evaluation of the ingroup and the outgroup by giving positive and negative values respectively. Again, the speakers are supposed to help participants find the positive features of the leftist camp and the negative ones in the case of the governing coalition: why it is more valuable and noble to be on the left than on the right.

I will study the speeches whether they offered positive evaluation of the ingroup and negative of the outgroup. The reaction by the crowd shows whether the participants agreed. Disagreement is difficult to measure because the same noises, like clamouring, may criticize the speaker as well as the person mentioned by the speaker. If some intelligible shouting accompanies the noise, one makes conclusions about the target of disagreement.

Emotional component

Emotions are difficult to measure in general, let alone at mass events because appliances to detect physiological symptoms cannot be used, and retrospective narratives, like online confessions and reports by the participants, are questionable means precisely because they are retrospective, whereas emotions affect and change promptly. Fortunately, Collins (2004) together with Schweingruber-McPhail (1999) and Sacks-Schegloff-Jefferson (1974) provides us with some instruments.[7]

Emotions will be measured by the quantity and, mainly, by the quality of interactions during the speeches.

- The frequency of the reactions by the crowd shows the emotional importance of the words, expressions and messages of the speech for the crowd.

- Obviously a longer reaction of, e.g., applause, laughing, booing, flaring etc. shows a higher level of liking on the side of the crowd than a shorter one.

- The speed of the reactions also matters: if the reaction is fast, that is, it starts in less than 1 second, the crowd is synchronized with the speaker and shows attachment, whereas a longer interval suggests a less emotional interaction because the crowd needs time first to understand: the speaker is actually asking for a reaction.

- Crowd behaviour is not limited to reactions; the audience may be proactive as well. In several cases the crowd does not stop talking and shouting when the speaker resumes. It also happens that the audience chants, that is, repeats rhythmically, some words and entertains itself for a while making the speaker wait quite a few seconds.

- Turn-taking shows much about the emotional attachment between the crowd and the speaker. The latter should react to the action, e.g., the shouting and clamouring of the former, otherwise the crowd feels rejected.

The research used two sources of data.

- A leftist television channel, ATV, broadcast the rally live; the recordings can be found on YouTube.[8] The channel focused on the speeches while the crowd reactions were secondary, still, one can hear the general noises and voices.

- A journalist, who regularly shoots films on public events, also recorded the speeches and, being among the crowd, the films contain the crowd reactions too, even if only those of the crowd around the camera.[9]

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[7] In another paper a similar description with more ethnographic content was offered on the three large rallies on the same day: Kiss-Szabó-Antal 2014.

[8] Bajnai, Gordon: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=j25gAw3MHHc
Ungár, Klára: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0v60tNQ2WhM
Bokros, Lajos: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ADFX3wM4Qpk
Kuncze, Gábor: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qBfEOSmyoP4
Gyurcsány, Ferenc: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4JSC0f83wgM,
Fodor, Gábor: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=YVmURRUmL2g
Szabó, Tímea: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0v60tNQ2WhM
Mesterházy, Attila: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=AFQ43eFy0dY,

Findings

The data make possible to present the texts and the audience reactions in three parts under each component. First, the textual traces will be discussed, second, the reactions of the audience, finally the dynamics of the component, that is, the changes as they unfolded in time.

The main data for the analysis can be found in Table 1 in Appendices. It contains in the order pronounced the labels, adjectives, statements and themes the speakers used as building blocks of the speeches. They, therefore, cover the cognitive, the evaluative and the emotional components the audience could take into account constructing political identity.

Cognitive component

As Table 1 shows, the speakers gave rather diverse pictures of the left. The labels most frequently and commonly used are the following: "democrats" and "democratic", "majority", "freedom loving". The rest differ extremely, and even the democratic character was questioned once by Ferenc Gyurcsány when he was criticizing the narrow pact MSZP and E-2014 – PM had signed the previous day.

There are several points that are diverse without being irreconcilable. A camp can be wide enough to include people who are "socialists, liberals, conservatives and greens" (Bokros, Fodor) and also the people from the right who are "uncertain" and "misguided" (Bajnai) but "belong to the nation" (Fodor). That is in harmony with the rejection of "uniformity" (Szabó) and the preference for "individuality" (Ungár).

The rest of the features and utterances are irreconcilable. The left "will win" (Bajnai, Ungár) and "may lose" (Kuncze, Gyurcsány, Fodor); will "change the government" and introduce "good governance" (Bajnai) but is "unable to meet the expectations of the society" (Kuncze); "lost trust," "underperforms" (Fodor); "forceful" (Bajnai, Mesterházy) and "loser" (Gyurcsány). The people in the left are "heroes" (Szabó, Mesterházy), they are the "revolutionaries of the day" (Szabó) "ready to fight" and, at the same time, "defeatists" who "must overcome themselves" (Gyurcsány).

Another group of cognitive clues are the statements on what are missing on the left. The "union among all the forces of the democratic opposition" is missing (Bokros,

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[9] Bajnai, Gordon: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=UDERgcsgAE8
Ungár, Klára: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Uc9svGEMViE
Bokros, Lajos: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kDGmsoa1eKY
Kuncze, Gábor: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=O7WiWvk1T_8
Gyurcsány, Ferenc: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6L4kJdXB3wU
Fodor, Gábor: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ElxEtajYJUs
Szabó, Tímea: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ETRvldbmFko
Mesterházy, Attila: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0v60tNQ2WhM

Kuncze, Gyurcsány and Fodor) as well as the "single leader" (Kuncze and Gyurcsány)

Certainly, Gyurcsány, Kuncze and Fodor sometimes applied the negative labels referring not really to the left as a whole, only to the narrow alliance. But they never mentioned names, not even the party names, and from time to time used first-person plural as if they were speaking about the whole camp. They underlined the importance of the leftist union, as if the victorious union of the left were impossible through the sheer voting for the narrow alliance in April. Thereby, they assigned a different meaning to the concept "union" from the one adopted by the narrow alliance, which promoted the direct union between the three parties and the leftist citizens.

Table 2 shows the characterization the speakers put forward regarding the rightist camp. Almost always Viktor Orbán was the target, his way of governance, and, more rarely, Fidesz, his party. No word was devoted to either the smaller governing party or to the extreme right party also in the parliament.

The image of the right is entirely coherent, with one slight contradiction. Gábor Kuncze characterized rightist voters as political minors in need of a paternal figure, while Gábor Fodor claimed that rightist voters also belonged to the nation. Otherwise the outgroup was constructed in a consistent manner for the audience, and, indeed, the participants were eager to boo, laugh and clamour hearing the name of the prime minister.

It is interesting to see which features proved to be the most salient during the rally. Table 3 contains the data.

Bajnai's speech was received with long, that is, longer than 9 second reaction six times.

- A short commemoration to the heroes of '56 attracted a rather quiet and slowly starting, probably forced applause of 16 seconds.
- The second occasion was a 10 second long reaction to the first use of the word "union" by a speaker; "Union" was later the main slogan among the crowd.
- The third was the speaker's promise that "we will do together," namely, change of government, but the applause and shouting were rather due to the fact that he used the name of the party (Together) and the crowd chanted the word rhythmically for long.
- The next two mentioned Viktor Orbán in negative context, and, again, the longer reaction also contained the rhythmic chanting "Orbán, clear off!" a recurrent theme later.
- The final reaction arrived after the sentence: "They have the brute force… but, my friends, the force is with us" which is a customary allusion to Star Wars.

Klára Ungár got two longer reactions only.

- The peace loving character of the leftist people got 10 seconds.

- And, again, criticism against Viktor Orbán by the speaker was accompanied with chanting "Orbán, clean off!" from the crowd for 29 seconds in all.

Lajos Bokros scored five long reactions.

- "No-one among us is afraid" 10 sec.
- The change of the government is a matter of life and death – 11 sec.
- Fidesz is not rightist but a neo-communist party - 12 sec.
- "We all believe in the inalienable right to freedom" – 11 sec.
- "The total and unconditional union of the democratic opposition is necessary" - 14 sec. Again, the concept of union had its effect this time, just like previously and in the future whenever a speaker mentioned it.

Gábor Kuncze got 23 reactions during his speech, as shown by Table 3. They were short, though, just five lasted longer than 9 seconds.

- "Respect to the heroes" of '56 - 10 sec.
- "The fight cannot be won by parleying disguised as union" - 11 sec.
- "The candidates with the highest chance to win should be found together" - 13 sec.
- "…the government can be changed" - 11 sec.
- "It is not enough to love freedom and democracy, one has to want it and act for it" - 10 sec.

Ferenc Gyurcsány is a special case because, in a couple of cases, he made conversations with the audience, which is obviously the most synchronised, the emotionally most intensive way of communication in such a situation. Still, one finds again the pattern unfolding so far: "union" and "Orbán must leave" are the best-received motives resulting in reactions of 22 and 15 seconds respectively in his case.

Gábor Fodor obtained positive long reactions in four cases.

- "Union is a moral command." Slogan "Union" provoked 10 seconds.
- "Hungary is colonized from inside by Fidesz, which is an organization disguised as a political party" - 25 seconds including a chanting "We won't let it!" for 11 second.
- At another occasion, Fodor also conversed with the audience on the underperformance of the opposition and its delay in acting properly.
- The criticism against the narrow leftist alliance produced applause of 11 seconds: "If Fidesz wins, the two parties will be responsible; the two parties that have chosen separation instead of cooperation."

Tímea Szabó was less successful in using words and expressions popular among the audience. She scored three longer reactions only.

- "Since 1990 no politician and political party have deceived Hungary the way Viktor Orbán and Fidesz have done for the past three years." The criticism of the outgroup entailed applause of 11 seconds.
- "We want a more free and just Hungary" - 12 sec.
- "We need each other to have power to fight the most important battle by which we can replace Viktor Orbán's inhuman regime." The 14 second reac-

tion was extended by chanting "Together", that is, the name of the leftist party in the narrow alliance.

Attila Mesterházy proved totally unsuccessful in offering positively received clues. His speech was accompanied by clamouring all along with short intervals and with only a single occasion when he got a 5 second long approval.

In sum, apart from the motive of freedom and harsh criticism referring to Viktor Orbán, hardly any pieces of knowledge became salient for the audience in the speeches. The recurrent positive reactions to the "Union" motive underline the uncertainty and the doubts about the conditions the camp had been pushed into with the sealing the narrow alliance the previous day.

Tables 1 to 4 give an idea of the cognitive dynamics. According the Table 4, the leftist conflicts are not mentioned in the first two speeches but cropping up with growing weight afterwards to move to the background in the last two speeches while overwhelming the crowd vocalizations.

- Although Bajnai alludes to the disappointment recent events may have caused but does not dwell on the topic.
- Ungár does not raise the question of the conflicts, and Bokros follows the pattern until the last minute of his performance. Then, he gets longish applauses, which suggests that the audience, at least a part of the crowd, is open to the theme of union.
- Kuncze enters the scene and he gives up the structure used so far: instead of talking about the bad situation and bad governance in Hungary and the importance of voting for the left, he devotes more than 70% of the speech to the conflict within the camp and what to do beyond the narrow alliance.
- In that, Gyurcsány follows him and for a while the disunion of the left becomes the main problem of the day with a confirming feedback from the audience.
- Fodor is more balanced thematically but does not suggest that the union with the citizens would be enough.
- Being part of the narrow alliance, Szabó appeals directly to the leftist citizens not mentioning the excluded parties.
- And, finally, Mesterházy apparently does not want to deal with the leftist conflict rather only with the bad situation of Hungary and the direct union with the people but cannot avoid coming up with an answer to Gyurcsány. The answer is rather weak and unspecific and does not mention names and parties, only the word "selfish" may remind the audience what and who the speaker is actually talking about.

In sum, if the participants wanted to clarify what makes someone leftist, how to recognize anyone as belonging to the camp, they might get puzzled seeing the leading figures have totally different views. For a while, at least the outgroup was clearly defined but with Kuncze and Gyurcsány suddenly the narrow alliance emerged as a serious outgroup within the old ingroup. Gyurcsány followed the path advised in

case one wants to give a cognitive construction of the ingroup and the outgroup; but now the outgroup is not Orbán and the right anymore but the narrow alliance while the ingroup consists of the excluded parties and movements together with the democratic voters at large.

Evaluative component

Table 1 also gives an overview of the evaluative content the speakers put forward regarding the left and the right. Table 5 contains their weights.

Again: the criticism, the negative evaluation is definitely present when speaking about the right. The prime minister, the government and Fidesz are said to be life-threatening, they destruct the country by misgovernment, terrify the everyday lives of the people, steal, cheat and lie all along, have created a hopeless situation for the citizens etc. It might be clear for the participants in the demonstration that the rightist camp is valueless; at least, moral people would not join it.

While the right is characterized profusely in the speeches much less can be made out as regards the left. Freedom and tolerance seem to be the only values agreed upon by all the speakers. Even if the leaders usually address the participants as "democrats", at a point, Ferenc Gyurcsány says that the agreement by the narrow alliance was not prepared in a democratic manner; it did not follow the will of the democratic voters.

As we have seen under the cognitive component, the features and statements pronounced by the leaders did not cohere and that is true regarding the values, which are also expressed by those very words. As the matter of fact, Ferenc Gyurcsány sets forth a remarkably rich vocabulary to evaluate the left: sometimes seemingly the whole camp, sometimes rather only the narrow alliance, the audience was certainly able to understand what and whom he meant by the different utterances. The left is defeatist, selfish, ungenerous, self-interested, uncompromising, and, Kuncze adds, betrays the case of freedom and also the compatriots fighting for liberty thereby undermining even the common devotion to freedom.

On the other hand, Gyurcsány gives specific evaluation to the actors outside the narrow alliance and he does it partly speaking about himself. He and his party are "ethical not political", "straightforward", "uncompromising with the right", "ready to fight", "self-sacrificing" and "passionate"; only positive evaluations in great length on the new ingroup in contradistinction with the narrow alliance, which is the new outgroup.

Regarding the feedback from the crowd, we have already seen which statements received the longest vocalizations and applauses. The audience seems to have approved all the negative assessments targeted on the right. On the one hand, except for the speech by Gyurcsány, hardly any criticism toward the left was approved with lengthy reactions. On the other hand, however, Kuncze's speech, the first to elaborate the theme, was reacted to outstandigly frequently even if with short vocalizations.

One may be allowed to draw the conclusion that the participants had not been prepared to the radical thematic turn, and needed time to get used to it. Anyway, the high frequency of reactions suggests that the crowd found the statements agreeable to their impressions and was eager to know more; they did not want to stop the speaker for long.

Again, Gyurcsány's performance is a special case. He provoked reactions from the audience by raising questions and urging the crowd to fill in sentences he started, a popular trick applied later by Fodor as well. That way, the politician did his best to and succeeded in drawing the participants into a dialogue to hammer the vital necessity of union in, by which he explicitly meant the "reopening" of the "talks" as well as the "agreement", which is "not durable" because had not been made in a "democratic manner". By the passionate dialogue, Gyurcsány probably also managed to draw the audience into condemning the narrow alliance.

Fodor also had a short "conversation" with the crowd on the underperformance of the left but the longest reaction he provoked was about the colonizing Fidesz. Szabó was joined by the audience only in criticising the right but she avoided all the critical statements on the left anyway. Mesterházy's only positive reaction from the crowd approved his attack against Orbán.

As for the dynamics of the evaluation, we found more or less the same process as in the cognitive dynamics with the difference that the critical speakers set forth much less specifically evaluative statements. Bajnai, Ungár, Bokros, Szabó and Mesterházy did what one would expect from politicians in opposition: condemned the governing parties and the prime minister going into great length, and praised, although less enthusiastically, the opposition. Kuncze and Gyurcsány broke the rule: they did not bother about the rightists, did not find much to praise on the left, and turned condemnation against the narrow alliance.

Emotional component

Table 1 shows that the speakers mention several emotions; they agree on some and disagree on quite a few. Practically all the politicians think that the country is "full of fears" and "hopelessness" and all agree that the leftists, perhaps the Hungarians in general, are freedom loving people. Then disagreement starts. Some think the leftists "do not fear" (Bokros), "they are the revolutionaries against hopelessness" (Szabó, Mesterházy), but they are also "resigned" (Mesterházy), "disappointed" (Bajnai) overwhelmed by the everyday worries (Mesterházy). The people belonging to the left "should not whine" (Kuncze) on the conditions, rather "be more optimistic" and "resolute" (Mesterházy) because, in reality, they are "full of force" (Mesterházy) and "can be proud of themselves" (Mesterházy). Still, the state of the left with the internal dissension menaces with defeat next April and the "shame" would be on the left and no-one else (Kuncze, Gyurcsány).

The two sides, that is, the narrow alliance versus the dissatisfied politicians of the rest, followed different emotional strategies in the texts. Quite reasonably, the former, Bajnai, Szabó and Mesterházy, emphasised the unfavourable conditions caused by the government on the one hand and the emotional capabilities of the left for making the future bright on the other. Kuncze and Gyurcsány did not go into the details of the present sufferings, focused rather on the emotions underpinning the faults of the left and, specifically, of the narrow alliance: defeatism, resignation, too much self-love and personal ambition causing damage to the leftist case, and drawing shame on the camp thereby.

The audience does not seem to have been susceptible to the sorrowful descriptions of the conditions. Booing and clamouring woke rather in reaction to the name of the prime minister and his party; the sheer reports on the situation in the country without naming the culprits did not raise activity. The themes of a strong left ("the force is with us") and of a hopeful future were received more enthusiastically but the crowd was the most active typically in two situations: when it could express its dislike towards the outgroup and when a chanting unfolded. The longest activities were, therefore, when "Orbán, clear off!" could be chanted and when, remarkably, the slogan "Union" could be repeated rhythmically as an attack against the narrow alliance.

The unfolding in time is characteristic, indeed.

- Although the first speaker, Bajnai, was a leader of the narrow alliance, his speech was received favourably: Table 3 shows that he got the longest positive reaction among the speakers. This is the most surprising because at the very beginning of his speech, a small choir started to chant a version of slogan "Union" but no followers from the crowd joined them, and when they started it again later, the chanting of "Together", the name of his party, prevailed.
- Ungár got less and shorter reactions with the exception of the case when "Orbán, clear off!" was repeated rhythmically.
- We find the same pattern in the case of Bokros: long clamouring against the right and enthusiasm for freedom and the fearlessness of the left. Nevertheless, at the end of his speech, a strong and relatively long applause of 14 seconds follows his claim for the wider union of the "democratic opposition".
- Kuncze elaborated the theme of union with many short acts of crowd support. Since then, the theme of union became even more appreciated by the crowd than "Orbán, clear off". He also put forward the option that if the narrow alliance is not willing to renegotiate the union and look for a common leader, the citizens may have to force them to do. By this point he explicitly appealed to the audience and asks the people to demand the opening of the agreement.
- Gyurcsány developed the theme of union and complemented it with very personal aspects, which provoked enthusiastic reactions. He spoke long on the need of a leader on the left. Conversing with the crowd he repeated a couple of times that the opposition did not need two leaders or three or eight but one single leader, who had not been found yet. The "two leaders" is an allusion to Bajnai and Mesterházy; the "three leaders" would also cover PM, the third

party in the narrow alliance, while the "eight leaders" would be the eight speakers of the rally.

- Fodor also has success with the theme of union, with the criticism against the government as well as the claim for the common leader.
- Szabó goes back to the pre-Kuncze structure and thematic set: criticism against the right, appraisal of freedom and the promise of the victory in April.
- Mesterházy had to face a massive clamouring and chanting "Union!" at the start. He reacted as if by union the crowd had meant the cooperation between the voters and the narrow alliance. He praised the audience and scorned Viktor Orbán but the audience resumed "Union!" from time to time and, apart from a single occasion, was not willing to approve anything he says.

Discussion

The paper has gone through the dynamics of the three components of political identity. We saw that an identity change unfolded during the rally especially since the end of the third speech (Bokros) and culminated in an angry identification against the leaders of the previously accepted leftist political community.

Until Bokros, the audience was content with the speeches of the politicians of both the narrow alliance (Bajnai) and the excluded parties (Ungár and Bokros): the crowd liked the criticism against the prime minister and the right in general and showed enthusiasm for E-2014 evidenced by long chanting its name during Bajnai's speech. The theme Union was offered by a small group but in vain, no big mass took it over. One can say that until the end of Bokros's speech, the speakers as well as the crowd kept the political identity as it was, practically and tacitly accepting the new conditions with the narrow alliance dominating the leftist political community.

With Kuncze, the mood and the identification started to change concluding in the rage against the prototype of the old community. Kuncze, Gyurcsány and Fodor put forward harsh discontent with the conditions the left was allegedly in: a too narrow alliance, lack of leader, dwindling chance to win in April.

All the three politicians repeated the same programmatic points what to do urgently but Kuncze and, chiefly, Gyurcsány were especially efficient and fast in establishing a new ingroup and outgroup, that is, a new identity. The two politicians practically covered all the components of the political identity:

- They gave a rich description of the new ingroup. The new left is an electoral alliance uniting all the citizens, movements and parties belonging to the democratic opposition.
- The new outgroup consists of the leading *persons* of the narrow alliance not willing to listen to the demands of the citizens.
- The new ingroup is valuable and noble because it is democratic (it listens to the people), self-sacrificing, unselfish, ready to fight, uncompromising towards the right, able to find the necessary leader, does everything to serve the country.

- The new outgroup is less valuable because it is undemocratic, selfish, resigned, uncompromising towards the fellow democrats, ungenerous, and betrays the Hungary of values and freedom.
- The new ingroup gets passionate attachment, which is not only claimed but performed by Gyurcsány as well. The late prime minister also performed the listening and communicating with the political community by conversing with the crowd and getting enthusiastic approvals.
- The new outgroup does not deserve attachment because it only whines about the bad conditions in the country and does not do anything whereby it brings shame on the leftist camp. The outgroup politicians serve only themselves and not the country, they parley about their own future positions in the parliament whereas they should be ready to resign instead if that is the condition of victory.

The leader as prototype plays a necessary role for the group members in the identification. The leader personifies all the three components. He knows and declares what keeps the community together. He has features and values that make the belonging attractive. Finally, he is likable.

As we saw it, while the structure of the rally suggested the state of leadership within the political community with Bajnai in the beginning and Mesterházy in the end framing the event and thereby signalling the leadership of Mesterházy, they never mentioned who the leader actually was, not even after having heard that Kuncze, Gyurcsány and Fodor had disapproved the lack of leader. Gyurcsány, in turn, implemented what Hogg defined as possible strategies to demonstrate his leadership.

- He used to be prime minister and the president of the Socialist Party; he was, thus, in the position to strengthen the old prototype, that is, the prototype he had introduced in the leftist camp years before. That contained passion, agility, and self-sacrifice, e.g., readiness to resign from a post when that seemed to help the community.[10]
- He also pilloried Bajnai and Mesterházy: threw them to public scorn and ridicule by criticizing and devaluating them.
- Demonization, which is the third strategy, was rather targeted at Viktor Orbán and not Bajnai or Mesterházy. That is reasonable because Gyurcsány wanted to make a compromise with them.

Now, we can discern what led to the wrath against Mesterházy by the end of the rally.

The participants had gone through all the quarrels and skirmishes of the previous years since Gyurcsány left the Socialist Party as well as those of the previous year since Bajnai announced his ambition to be the leader of the opposition in October 2012. They had also lived through the tensions about the establishment of the narrow alliance for the previous two months. Part of them was certainly happy with the new set up; the rest was ambivalent or disappointed. All of them had been well aware

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[10] Hogg underlines that perception is what matters in the prototypicality rather than the real motives and actions.

that the excluded politicians were discontent. Those who identified with the latter might feel rejected by the narrow alliance.

Then was the rally announced as a demonstration where the speakers would not criticize each other, they would focus on the need to cooperate within the camp instead.

The event started in that atmosphere. But with Bokros and Kuncze the same feeling of rejection might overcome a great part of the audience, certainly those who had chanted "Union!" at the very beginning but then in vain yet. Suddenly it turned out that leaders whom they attached to were not given the status deserved and, through them, the supporters were also rejected. The feeling must have been the worse because the experience frustrated the hopes and the sheer presence at the rally did not make sense anymore. According to Scheff, the cycle leading to rage can be stopped at this point by discussing and alleviating the injuries. The crowd did what was possible to do that: chanted at every possible moment their wish "Union!" and was probably waiting for the only person in the position to react properly.

Mesterházy came but from the very first moment it was clear that he was not in the possession of a solution and was even unwilling to improvise one, a temporary at least. He did not take the shouting and chanting seriously, could not disentangle the situation. He started the speech without bending to the will of the audience, without interacting or communicating with the crowd, got to the end and left. Afterwards he announced that his resolution not to extend the alliance had been strengthened by the incident because politicians willing to conspire against a fellow leader cannot be trusted.

Still, in three months, under the deteriorating opinion poll results and partly under the effect of the October rally, a new alliance including Gyurcsány, Kuncze and Fodor was made with Mesterházy in the leadership. It suffered a sweeping defeat in April 2014.

Conclusion

The rally was a failure in terms of the purpose of the political leaders. It is obvious that the leaders of the narrow alliance needed a demonstration that would have provided the pact signed the previous day with legitimacy and acquiescence from the part of the rest while the leaders outside the alliance hoped for an occasion to put the big ones under pressure and make them revise the pact. Eventually, the event did not satisfy anyone. The narrow alliance did not get the legitimacy and got insulted instead, while the politicians outside did not obtain any signs of a possible admittance, just the opposite: the president of MSZP rejected the idea even more definitely than before. It is true that all the participants were happy to express their dislike towards Viktor Orbán, and that established a negative community, and the separate groups of sympathizers of the different parties might feel pleasure to shout and applaud for their respective leaders and even create a new outgroup of the narrow alliance, but that was hardly the main objective of the organizers or of the participants. Appearing and speaking on the same stage did not transform the politicians and their followers

into an overarching community, did not strengthen the leftist political identity, rather the opposite: made it even more uncertain and ambivalent, fragmented and devaluated.

Political crowd events are necessary pillars of political communities; politicians are well aware of that, otherwise they would not organize such occasions. Moreover, rallies may promote and extend the community by attracting people for the next occasion by media coverage. Thus, they can be handy instruments for the politicians. On the other hand, ignoring the autonomy of the crowd, the feelings, interpretations and evaluations participants usually have independently of the intentions of the organizers will result in unforeseeable effects. Political rallies are incalculable both in their prompt proceedings and even more so when it comes to the interpretations and memories the attendees will produce and harbour afterwards.

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Appendices

Table 1 The characteristics of the left in the order of mentioning

BAJNAI	UNGÁR	BOKROS	KUNCZE	GYURCSÁNY	FODOR	SZABÓ	MESTERHÁZY
democrats	**democrats**	**fearless**	**democrats**	may lose in April	**democrats**	**democrats**	**democrats**
some are disappointed	patriots	social democrats, liberals and conservatives	majority but not enough	may lose the case of freedom, of republic, of progress, of European life	**freedom** loving	not uniform	less optimist than should and could be
I am determined	majority	have right to freedom	not political minors	majority	**liberals, socialists, conservatives** and green	want democratic, deception free elections	**resolute**
who will change the government	people with individuality	cold head and hot heart	**do not whine on the conditions**	must overcome ourselves	do not want Hungary the colony of the right	want a free and more just Hungary	full of force
want good governance	thinking		**shame is on us** if Fidesz wins again	bad habits	pseudo debates in the opposition	small **heroes**	**can be proud** of themselves
want **normal Hungary**	citizens civil		unable to meet the order of the society	defeatism	had trust in the opposition a year ago	heroes of the revolution against hopelessness	everyday heroes
join forces	equal		self-interested	dissension	lost trust in the opposition	revolutionaries of today	**full of fears**
also those who are still uncertain and misguided	believe in freedom		loser	**selfishness**	underperform		worried about the bills
the rightist and leftist majority	believe in democracy		may betray the Hungary of freedom, civil values and solidarity	**want union** among parties, movements and supporters	lost a year		cannot become indignant
Hungarians	**we will win**		may betray compatriots	the hindrance against union	the cause of possible defeat in April		resign to the conditions
peace-loving			love freedom	resignation	must overcome ourselves		**hopeless**
the force is with us			not enough to love freedom, one has to do for it	lack of generosity			should vote for the democrats

silent ma-jority				uncom-promising			not ene-mies of each other on the left
we will win				**selfish**			needs bravery and audaci-ty
				have too strong personal ambitions			
				have fault in losing			
				want free Hungary			
				need a single lead-er			
				ready to fight			
				passionate			
				ethical			
				straight-forward			
				self-sacrificing			
				serve the country			
				undemo-cratic agreement			
				worried for the country			

Note: features mentioned more than once by the speaker are in bold.

Table 2 The characteristics of the right: Viktor Orbán, the government and Fidesz

BAJNAI	UNGÁR	BOKROS	KUNCZE	GYUR-CSÁNY	FODOR	SZABÓ	MESTER-HÁZY
monopo-lize the country: *Orbánland*	Orbán is Imre Nagy* upside down	terrify people	political minors	Viktor Orbán a lying polit-ical scoun-drel	threaten freedom	frighten the people	Orbán is **the Mara-dona of Felcsút****
have the power, the media, the money and brute force	like Ceausescu	neo-com-munists	paternalist leader	made a non-democratic constitu-tion	colonize Hungary from inside	**deceived** the people	frighten people
like the captain of Titanic	likes Putin	destructive governance			an organi-zation in a party dis-guise	they **steal**	**injustice**
destroy economy	makes friends with dicta-tor	contorted the elec-toral sys-tem			behave like occupiers	they **cheat**	cause **fear**
	despise and humil-iate women	not a na-tional party			the rightist people also belong to the nation	they **lie**	cause hope-lessness
	humiliate everybody	deceive the voters			underper-form	steal estates	operate despotism
	haughty petty mon-archs	not a right-ist party				corrupt	from a young democrat Orbán has become a greying despot
	without principles	not demo-crats					Viktor Orbán is the enemy
	want the fat bits						
	revengeful						
	occupy the country						
	dictate to everybody						
	invade institu-tions, hos-pitals, schools						

* Imre Nagy, originally communist, was the prime minister during the revolution of 1956. Later he was executed by the Kádár regime.

**Viktor Orbán is a passionate fan of soccer. He lived in Felcsút, a small village, as a child.

Table 3 Positive crowd reactions to the speakers in seconds

	Bajnai	Ungár	Bokros	Kuncze	Gyurcsány	Fodor	Szabó	Mesterházy
1	7	4	10	10	6	3	11	5
2	16	6	8	5	4	2	5	
3	10	7	7	4	5	6	5	
4	21	4	11	3	6	4	12	
5	4	4	3	8	15	25	5	
6	10	9	5	9	14	9	7	
7	17	4	12	7	3	7	5	
8	9	8	5	3	7	11	8	
9	9	5	14	2	7	9	3	
10	3	3	11	4	22		14	
11	9	5	4	11	9			
12	2	8	14	7	12			
13	9	10	8	7	4			
14	3	29	4	4	8			
15	9	3		13	5			
16	15	3		3	10			
17	6			7	3			
18				3				
19				11				
20				8				
21				3				
22				6				
23				10				
Total time of reactions in seconds*	159	112	116	148	140	76	75	5
Lengths of the speeches in seconds	680	366	448	469	706	567	444	480

Table 4. The weights of the cognitive component

	total number of words	the bad conditions of Hungary*		union of the leftist citizens		conflicts on the left	
		words	percentage	words	percentage	words	percentage
Bajnai, Gordon	843	403	48%	199	24%	0	0%
Ungár, Klára	365	176	48%	130	36%	0	0%
Bokros, Lajos	530	159	30%	97	18%	47	9%
Kuncze, Gábor	610	91	15%	6	1%	434	71%
Gyurcsány, Ferenc	890	65	7%	0	0%	646	73%
Fodor, Gábor	785	312	40%	24	3%	304	39%
Szabó, Tímea	709	165	23%	460	65%	0	0%
Mesterházy, Attila	798	412	52%	88	11%	127	16%

Table 5 Evaluations

	Total number of words	Viktor Orbán and the government - negative		Other right - negative		Left - positive		Left - negative	
		number of words	percentage	words	percentage	words	percentage	words	percentage
Bajnai, Gordon	843	210	25%	14	2%	97	12%	0	0%
Ungár, Klára	365	102	28%	30	8%	90	25%	0	0%
Bokros, Lajos	530	0	0%	125	24%	69	13%	0	0%
Kuncze, Gábor	610	37	6%	36	6%	23	4%	155	25%
Gyurcsány, Ferenc	890	7	1%	0	0%	14	2%	185	21%
Fodor, Gábor	785	0	0%	115	15%	42	5%	83	11%
Szabó, Tímea	709	46	6%	66	9%	168	24%	0	0%
Mesterházy, Attila	798	289	36%	0	0%	92	12%	76	10%